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1．　Intro“uction
　　　　Many　IT　businesses　have　indicated　that　cloud　computing　is　a　very　promising　emerging
computer　technology　and　will　likely　achieve　a　superior　position　in　network　computer　tech－
nologies．　However，　there　is　no　widely　agreed　upon　and　concrete　definition　on　what　constitUtes
cloud　computing．　Some　may　say　that　cloud　computing　means　SaaS（So負ware　as　a　Service），
and　others　may　define　cloud　computing　as　grid　computing．　In　fact，　there　have　been　some　grid、
computing　based　SaaS　services　via　the　lnternet　which　have　been　categorized　as‘cloud　comput－
ing’．　On　the　other　hand，　some　people　use‘cloud　computing’as　a　synonym　of　simple　hosting
services，　data　center　services　or　ASP（Application　Service　Provider）services．　Recently，　the
National　InstitUte　of　Standards　and　Technology（NIST）released　its　l　5th　redefinition　of“cloud
computing　service”l　as：
Essential　Characteristics：
On－de〃2and　self二service，　A　consumer　can　unilaterally　provision　computing　capabilities，
such　as　server　time　and　network　storage，　as　needed　automatically　without　requiring　hu－
man　interaction　with　each　service’s　provider．
Broad　network・access．　Capabilities　are　available　over　the　network　and　accessed　through
standard　mechanisms　that　promote　use　by　heterogeneous　thin　or　thick　client　platforms
（e．g．，　mobile　phones，　laptops，　and　PDAs）．
Resource　pooling．　The　provider’s　computing　resources　are　pooled　to　serve　multiple　con－
sumers　using　a　multi－tenant　model，　with　different　physical　and　virtual　resources　dynami－
cally　assigned　and　reassigned　according　to　consumer　demand．　There　is　a　sense　of　loca－
tion　independence　in　that　the　customer　generally　has　no　control　or　knowledge　over　the
exact　location　of　the　provided　resources　but　may　be　able　to　specify　location　at　a　higher
level　of　abstraction（e．g．，　country，　state，　or　datacenter）．　Examples　of　resources　include
storage，　processing，　memory，　network　bandwidth，　and　virtual　machines．
Rapid　elasticめ～．　Capabilities　can　be　rapidly　and　elastically　provisioned，　in　some　cases
automatically，　to　quickly　scale　out　and　rapidly　released　to　quickly　scale　in．　To　the　con－
sumer，　the　capabilities　available　fbr　provisioning　often　appear　to　be　unlimited　and　can　be
purchased　in　any　quantity　at　any　time．
Measured　Sen／ice．　Cloud　systems　automatically　control　and　optimize　resource　use　by
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leveraging　a　metering　capaりility　at　some　level　of　abstraction　appropriate　to　the　type　of
service（e．g。，　storage，　processing，　bandwidth，　and　active　user　accounts）．　Resource　usage
can　be　monitored，　controlled，　and　reported　providing　transparency　fbr　both　the　provider
and　consumer　of　the　utllized　service．
Service　Models：
Cloud　Software　as　a　Service（SaaS？．　The　capability　provided　to　the　consumer　is　to　use
the　provider’s　applications　runn童ng　on　a　cloud　infrastructUre．　The　applications　are　acces－
sible　from　various　client　dev孟ces　through　a　thin　client　interface　such　as　a　web　browser
（e．g．，　web－based　email）．　The　consumer　does　not　manage　or　control　the　underlying　cloud
inf㌃astnuctUre　including　network，　servers，　operating　systems，　storage，　or　even　individual
application　capabilities，　with　the　possible　exception　of　limited　user－specific　application
COnfigUratiOn　SettingS．
Cloud　Plaグbrm　as　a　Service（PaaS）．　The　capability　provided　to　the　consumer　is　to　de－
ploy　onto　the　cloud　infrastructUre　consumer－created　or　acquired　applications　created　us－
ing　programming　languages　and　tools　supported　by　the　provider．　The　consumer　does　not
manage　or　control　the　underlying　cloud　infrastructure　including　netWork，　servers，　operat－
ing　systems，　or　storage，　but　has　control　over　the　deployed　applications　and　possibly　appli－
cation　hosting　environment　configurations．
Cloud　lnfrastructure　asαService（laaS）．　The　capability　provided　to　the　consumer　is
to　provision　processing，　storage，　networks，　and　other　fUndamental　computing　resources
where　the　consumer　is　ab董e　to　deploy　and　run　arbitrary　software，　which　can　include　oper－
ating　systems　and　applications．　The　consumer　does　not　manage　or　control　the　underlying
cloud　infrastructUre　but　has　control　over　operating　systems，　storage，　deployed　applica－
tions，　and　possibly　limited　control　of　select　networking　components（e．g．，　host　firewalls）．
Deployment　Models：
Private　cloud．　The　cloud　infrastructUre　is　operated　solely　for　an　organization．　It　may　be
managed　by　the　organization　or　a　third　party　and　may　exist　on　premise　or　off　premise．
Co〃1〃2〃η’ζソcloud．　The　cloud　infrastructUre　is　shared　by　several　organizations　and　sup－
ports　a　specific　community　that　has　shared　concerns（e．g．，　mission，　security　requirements，
policy，　and　compliance　considerations）．　It　may　be　managed　by　the　organizations　or　a
third　party　and　may　exist　on　premise　or　off　premise．
Public　cloud．　The　cloud　infrastructUre　is　made　available　to　the　general　public　or　a　large
industry　group　and　is　owned　by　an　organization　selling　cloud　services．
HJかid　cloud．　The　cloud　in丘astnユcture　is　a　composition　of　two　or　more　clouds（private，
community，　or　public）that　remain　unique　entities　but　are　bound　together　by　standardized
or　proprietary　technology　that　enables　data　and　apPlication　portability（e．9・，　cloud　burst－
ing　fbr　load－balancing　between　clouds）．
　　　　This　may　be　the　most　reliable　official　definition　of　cloud　computing．　However，　the　defini－
tion　has　been　revised　l　5　times，　and　will　likely　be，　as　of　the　date　of　this　article，　revised　again　in
the　near　fUtUre．　As　technologies　used　in　cloud　computing　have　not　been　completed　yet，　more
mechanisms，　fUnctions　and　application　softWare　will　likely　be　added　to　current　cloud　computer
models，　and　fUndamental　design　and　usage　of　cloud　computing　may　be　changed　and　enhanced．
　　　　Another　definition　of　cloud　computing　can　be　found　in　a　patent　application（United　States
Cloud　Computing　Service　and　Legal　lssues3
Patent　Application　20030051021）2．　Claim　l　of　the　patent　is：
αaim　1．
Avirtualized　logical　server　cloud，　comprising：aplurality　of　logical　servers，．each　having
persistent　attributes　that　establish　its　identity；anetwork　system；a　plurality　of　physical
servers，　each　coupled　to　physical　resources　including　a　network　resource　fbr　interfacing’
the　network　system，　a　data　storage　resource　and　a　processor　resource，　and　each　physical
server　executing　vi血lalization　software　that　virtualizes　one　or　more　of　the　physical　re－
sources　for　logical　servers　that　are　linked　to　that　physical　server；and　a　server　cloud　man－
ager，　interfaced　to　the　plurality　of　physical　servers，　that　establishes　and　maintains　status
and　instance　information　for　the　plurality　of　logical　servers　including　the　persistent　and
non－per3istent　attributes　that　link　each　logical　server　with　a　physical　server．
　　　　As　we　cannot　fix　a　logically　complete　and　static　definition　on　the　terrn　cloud　computing，　I
would　like　to　examine　this　concept　by　limiting　and　observing　already　implemented　cloud　com－
puting　services　in　the　IT　industry．
　　　　There　have　been　two　different　types　of　cloud　computing　service　offered　by　the　IT　indus－
try：one　is　the　public　cloud　computing　service（げthe　NIST　definition）and　the　other　is　a　private
cloud　computing　service（（ゾthe　NIST　definition）．　Users　of　a　public　cloud　can　share　same　re－
sources　on　the　same　computer　system　as　their　own　virtual　computer　systems．　And　businesses
can　hold　and　manage　their　private　cloud　in　which　employees　of　the　business　can　share　the
private　cloud　system　and　use　their　own　virtual　computer　on　the　private　cloud　computer　system
via　their　local　area　network　system　or　the　Internet．　These　may　look　like　a　modernized　resource
sharing　system　of　IBM’s　old　VM（Virtual　Machine）system．　In　fact，　IBM　provides　both　types
of　cloud　computing　service．　In　addition　to　such　fbmler　main仕ame　computer　companies，　Mi－
croso負（in　the　form　of　Azure），　Amazon（in　the　form　of　EC2（Elastic　Computing　Cloud））and
Google　also　provide　interesting　cloud　computing　services．
　　　　These　cloud　computing　services　are　very　usefU13．　However，　I　believe　that　the　public　cloud
computing　service　model　may　cause　some　critical　legal　and　computer　security　issues4．　These
issues　arise　as　a　result　of　the　cloud　computer　being　a　virtual　computer　system；users　share　the
same　computer　resources　of　the　cloud　computer，　but　the　authority　of　the　user　to　manage　the
cloud　computer　is　inferior　tq　authority　of　management　body（or　owner）of　the　cloud　computer
service（or　system）and　the　users　have　control　of　only　a　virtual　computer　and　share　services
but　do　not　control　a　physical　machine　or　installed　application　software　on　that　machine5．　This
means　that　any　user　of　a　public　cloud　computer　may　be　able　to　control　their　con飼ential　data
on　the　virtual　computer　but　not　be　able　to　control　physical　system，　and　similarly　can　perform
an　electric　audit　only　on　the　virtual　database　system　but　not　on　the　physical　computer　system．
2See　also　WIPO　Patent　Application　WO／2003／021396．
3George　Reese，　Cloud　Application　Architectures，0’Reilly（2009）
4Gartner：Seven　cloud－computing　security　risks
　InfoWorld：July　O2，2008
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In　additioh，　every　user　shares　the　same　resources　on　the　public　cloud　computer　system，　but
other　users　ofthe　same　public　cloud　computer　may　be　competitor　companies．
　　　　In　this　article，1　examine　some　legal　issues　which　may　take　place　on　a　typical　public　cloud
computer　service　mainly　in　the　context　ofJapanese　laws・
2．　Personal　Data　and　Privacy　Protection
　　　　Many　businesses　have　enj’oyed　the　benefits　of　having　data　processing　and　data　storage
perfbrmed　on　outside　computer　systems　with　outsourcing　services．　Utilizing　outsourcing
services　is　a　common　practice　in　modern　business。　As　a　part　of　these　outsourclng　services，
personal　data　is　often　processed　on　third　party’s　computer　system　and　stored　on　yet　another
outsourced　datacenter　system．
　　　　To　ensure　reasonable　protection　of　personal　information　including　personal　information
which　is　handled　in　commercial　data　outsourcing，　the　Personal　lnformation　Protection　Act6（the
“PIPA”jwas　enacted　in　Japan．　Article　220fthe　PIPA　provides：
Article　22（Supervision　of　Trustees）
When　a　business　operator　handling　personal　inforrnation　entrusts　an　individual　or　a　busi－
ness　operator　with　the　hand豆ing　of　personal　data　in　whole　or　in　part，　it　shall　exercise　nec－
essary　and　apPropriate　supervision　over　the　trustee　to　ensure　the　security　control　of　the
entmsted　personal　data．
　　　　The　Japanese　central　government　has　announced　continuously　that　the　Japanese　PIPA　is
fUlly　compatible　with　EU　Data　Protection　Directive，　however　I　think　it　provides　less　protec－
tion　for　personal　infomlation　than　does　the　EU　Directive7．　For　instance，　Article　l　70f　the　EU
Directive　provides：
Article　17．　Security　of　processing
LMember　States　shall　provide　that　the　controller　must　implement　appropriate　technical
　　and　organizational　measures　to　protect　personal　data　against　accidental　or　unlawfU1　de－
　　struction　or　accidental　loss，　alteration，　unauthorized　disclosure　or　access，　in　particular
　　where　the　processing　involves　the　transmission　of　data　over　a　network，　and　against　all
other　unlawfU1　forms　of　processing．
　　Having　regard　to　the　state　of　the　art　and　the　cost　of　their　implementation，　such　mea－
　　sures　shall　ensure　a　level　of　security　apPropriate　to　the　risks　represented　by　the　process－
　　ing　and　the　nature　ofthe　data　to　be　protected．
2．The　Member　States　shall　provide　that　the　controller　must，　where　processing　is　carried
　　out　on　his　behalf，　choose　a　processor　providing　suf〔icient　guarantees　in　respect　of　the
　　technical　security　measures　and　organizational　measures　governing　the　processing　to
6　Act　on　the　Protection　of　Personal　lnformation（Act　No．570f　2003）
　http：／／www．cas．go．jp／jp／seisaku／hourei／data／APPI．pdf
7Directive　95／46／EC　of　the　European　Parliament　and　of　the　Council　of　24　October　l　9950n　the　protection　of
　　individuals　with　regard　to　the　processing　of　personal　data　and　on　the　free　movement　of　such　data
　http：／／eur－lex．europa．eu／LexUriServ／LexUriServ．do？uri＝CELEX：31995LOO46：EN：HTML
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　　be　carried　out，　and　must　ensure　compliance　with　those　measures．
3．The　carrying　out　of　processing　by　way　of　a　processor　must　be　govemed　by　a　contract
　　or　legal　act　binding　the　processor　to　the　controller　and　stipulating　in　particular　that：
　　－the　processor　shall　act　only　on　instuctions　from　the　controller，
　　－the　obligations　set　out　in　paragraph　l，　as　defined　by　the　law　of　the　Member　State　in
　　which　the　processor　is　established，　shall　also　be　incumbent　on　the　processor．
4・For　the　purposes　of　keeping　proof，　the　parts　of　the　contract　or　the　legal　act　relating　to
　　data　protection　and　the　requirements　relating　to　the　measures　referred　to　in　paragraph　l
shall　be　in　writing　or　in　another　equivalent　form．
　　　　The　problematic　language　in　the　PIPへis‘approρriate　supen／ision　over　the　trustee　to　en－
sure　the　security　control　of　the　entrusted　personal　data’．　ApPropriate　control　of　personal　data
as　computer　processed　data　can　be　performed　subject　to　well　established　information　security
measures，　especially　utilizing　technological　ways　to　maintain　confidentiality　of　the　data．　This
should　be　exactly　same　in　the　context　ofdata　processing　and　data　storage　on　a　cloud　computeL
　　　　For　instance，　a　user（“U”）can　supervise　specific　data　over　virtual　system　or　virtual　data－
base，　but　never　controI　real　public　cloud　computer　system（“X”）or　physical　database　system．
In　this　case，　only　owner　or　management　body　of　X（“MB”）has　the　control　on　the　X　and　U
is　one　of　the　users　of　X．　In　addition，　application　so食ware　has　to　be　provided　from　X．　Also，
even　if　such　so負ware　cannot　adequately　protect　personal　data，　U　would　not　be　able　to　remove
or　repair　the　application　softWare　to　maintain　adequate　protection　of　personal　data，　because
such　application　softWare　is　shared　by　every　user　of　X　and　maintained　only　by　the　manage－
ment　body　of　X　under　a　standard　information　security　management　policy．　In　the　world　of
public　cloud　computing　service，　only　X’s　privaey　policy　and　security　policy　can　appl）へU’s
privacy　policy　and　security　policy　would　be　inferior　in　application　to　X’s　p61icies　always．　In
other　word，　U　has　no　authority　to　control　X　or　other　ability　to　implement　its　security　protocols
should　X　not　comply　with　U’s　instnlctions．
　　　　Moreover，　in　the　particular　case　of　grid　computing－based　cloud　computing，　user　U　can
㎞ow　a　logical　ad（iress　of　virtUal　database　system，　but　not　identify　any　physical　address　on　an
identifiable　specific　physical　hard　drive　on　a　physically　locating　database　system．　This　may　be
due　to　a　characteristic　of　grid　computing　architecture．　Also，　U　and　its　audit　firm　cannot　suf：
ficiently　perform　a　computer　data　audit：though　they　can　examine　a　logical　address　and　logi－
cally　locate　data　on　Us　virtual　system　and　virtual　database　on　the　grid－based　cloud　computer
In　some　cases，　the　owner　of　management　body　of　X　may　no色be　able　to　identify　the　physical
address　of　Us　specific　data　too．　In　such　a　case，　U　would　never　have　adequate　control　on　any
personal　information　which　U　is　obligated　to　have　control　over．
　　　　Due　to　these　reasons，　a　user　of　a　specific　public　cloud　computer　service　is　unable　to　have
adequate　control　over　the　physical　public　cloud　computer　system　and　public　cloud　database
system　as　required　by　Article　220f　the　PIPA．
　　　　Therefbre，　in　general，　personal　data　processing　and　data　storage　in　virtual　computer　or
virtUal　database　on　public　cloud　may　be　regarded　no　complying　with　the　personal　information
protection　management　obligations　set　out　in　the　Japanese　PIPA．
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3．　Trade　Secret
　　　　Trade　secrets　can　be　protected　under　the　Unfair　Competition　Prevention　Act8（the“UCPA”）
in　Japan．　Article　2（6）of　the　UCPA　defines：
Article　2．
（6）The　te㎜“trade　secret”as　used　in　this　Act　means　technical　or　business　information
　　　　usefU1　for　commercial　activities　such　as　manufactUring　or　marketing　methods　that　is
　　　　kept　secret　and　that　is　not　publicly　known．
　　　　This　definition　provision　is　similar　to　that　of　Uniform　Trade　Secrets　Act（UTSA）．　Section
1（4）of　the　UTSA　defines：
Section　1．】Definitions
（4）“Trade　secret”means　information，　including　a　formula，　pattem，　compilation，　pro－
　　　　gram，　device，　method，　tec㎞ique，　or　process，　that：
（i）
（il）
derives　independent　economic　value，　actUal　or　potential，　from　not　being　gener－
ally　known　to，　and　not　being　readily　ascertainable　by　proper　means　by，　other
persons　who　can　obtain　economic　value　from　its　disclosure　or　use，　and
is　the　subj　ect　of　efforts　that　are　reasonable　under　the　circumstances　to　maintain
lts　secrecy．
　　　　The　problem　with　the　language　in　the　UCPA　is　the　limitation　of　definition　of　trade　secret
to　that　technical　or　business　information　‘that　is　kept　secret’．　In　the　context　of　computer　data　as
trade　secret　information，　a　‘trade　secret　owner　should　also　obligate　anyone　with　access　to　the
information　to　protect　its　secrecy’9．
　　　　Of　course，　the　information　of　a　user　of　a　virtual　cloud　computer　system　can　be　kept　se－
cret，　but　maintaining　such　secrecy（confidentiality）is　also　virtual．
　　　　Due　to　computer　security　reasons　or　maintenance　of　physical　equipment　of　a　specific
public　cloud　computer，　the　management　body　of　the　public　cloud　can　examine，　confirm，　repair
or　exchange　physical　hard　disks　on　which　user’s　data　may　be　stored．　A　user　would　not　be　able
to　block　such　examination，　mending　and　so　on　by　the　management　body　of　the　public　cloud
computeriO．
　　　　For　example，　if　a　specific　user’s　data　was　infected　by　computer　a　virus　or　malware　was
installed　on　user’s（virtual）hard　drive　then　the　management　body　of　the　public　cloud　computer
would　have　to　remove　such　security　risks；on　the　other　hand　such　user　would　not　be　able　to
8Unfair　Competition　Prevention　Act（Act　No．470f　May　l　9，1993）
　　http：／／www．tomeika．jur．kyushu－u．ac．jp／ip／legislation／unfair＿competition」｝reventnion＿act．pdf
gDavid　W．　Quinto＆Stuart　H．　Singer，　Trade　Secrets，　Oxfbrd　University　Press（2008），　p．17
10See，　Cloud　Security　Alliance　Issues　Version　Two　of　Guidance　Identifying　Key　Practices　fbr　Secure
　　Adoption　ofCloud　Computing
　　San　Francisco，　CA，　Dec　l　7，2009
　　http：／／www．cloudsecurityalliance．org／pr20091217・html
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perform　such　security　response　because　such　user　is　not　the　root　of　the　public　cloud　computer．
In　such　a　case，　the　secrecy（confidentiality）ofuser’s　information　may　be　compromised．
　　　　This　is　the　same　even　if　a　specific　usefs　important　data　has　been　encrypted，　because　data
encryption　application　software，　when　used，　is　provided　by　the　shared　public　cloud　computing
service　provider　as　a　part　of　the　shared　public　cloud　computing　service，　and　the　management
body　of　the　public　cloud　computing　service　may　have　access　to　the　decryption－key　fbr　the
encrypted　data．　On　the　contrary，　a　user　cannot　install　any　different　encryption　apPlication　sofト
ware　into　the　user’s　virtual　computer　on　the　public　cloud　computer。　Any　application　software
is　provided　as　common　shared　application　software　of　the　public　cloud　computing　service．
　　　　For　these　reasons，　it　may　not　be　possible　to　maintain　the　secrecy　of　important　information
on　a　user’刀@virtual　computer　on　a　public　cloud　computer　system　even　when　the　user　undertakes
reasonable　effort　to　maintain　secrecy．　Therefbre，　in　genera1，　a　public　cloud　computing　envi－
ronment　may　not　be　fit　fbr　trade　secret　protection．
4．　Jurisdictional　issues
　　　　The　jurisdictional　matter　is　the　most　problematic　issue，　not　only　in　the　case　ofcloud　com－
puting　but　also　almost　every　netWork　computer　service，　because　all　of　the　top　service　provid－
ers（especially　cloud　computing　service　providers）are　American　corporations：fbr　instance
Microsoft，　IBM，　Google，　Amazon，　Cisco，　HP　and　so　on．
　　　　If　a　user　is　located　in　the　United　States　too　then　there　may　be　not　so　many　jurisdictional
issues，　except　fbr　interstate　issues．　However，　the　legal　status　of　a　non－American　user　is　com－
pletely　different　from　an　American　user．　Most　service　provider　service　contracts　include
choice　of　forum　and　choice　of　law　provisions．　Such　provisions　can　provide　the　American　ser一
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vice　provider　with　a　clear　advantage　over　non－American　user，　by　fbr　instance‘indicating　that
the　courts　located　in　New　York　City，　New　York　State，　the　United　States　shall　have　exclusive
jurisdiction’，　or　that　all　disputes　and　controversies　arising　under　the　contract‘shall　resolved
pursuant　to　the　law　of　the　state　of　Illinois，　with　United　States　Federal　law　applicable　as　applied
in　the　Northem　District　of　Illinois’and　so　on．
　　　　On　the　other　hand，　even　if　a　non－American　user　of　a　cloud　computing　service　has　a　better
privacy　policy　and　computer　security　policy，　the　user’s　policies　will　take　an　inferior　statUs　to
the　policies　ofAmerican　service　provider．
　　　　This　issue　may　be　one　of　the　most　common　issues　that　arises　and　such　common　lssue
should　be　interpreted　and　resolved　by　common　legal　theories　and　practicesii．　However，　one
has　to　recogniz．e　and　be　reminded　that　every　major　cloud　computing　service　provider　is　located
in　the　United　States．
5． Incident　Cases
　　　　These　concerns　have　already　described　by　some　peoplei2
For　instance，　ENISA　noted15：
inclu ing RSAI3　and　ENISA’｛4．
DATA　PROTECTION：cloud　computing　poses　several　data　protection　risks　fbr　cloud
customers　and　providers．　In　some　cases，　it　may　be　diflicult　fbr　the　cloud　customer（in
its　role　as　data　controller）to　effectively　check　the　data　handling　Practices　of　the　cloud
provider　and　thus　to　be　sure　that　the　data　is　handled　in　a　lawfUl　wa》孔This　problem　is　ex－
acerbated　in　cases　of　multiple　transfers　of　data，　e．g．，　between　federated　clouds．　On　the
other　hand，　some　cloud　providers　do　provide　information　on　their　data　handling　practices，
Some　also　offer　certification　summaries　on　their　data　processing　and　data　security　activi－
ties　and　the　data　controls　they　have　in　place，　e．g．，　SAS70　certification．
　　　　Incident　relating　to　cloud　computing　services　have　been　anticipated　and　described　in
theoretical　papers，　however　in　2009　there　were　actUal　security　breaches　and　accidents．　For　in－
stance，　all　of　the　customer　data　on　Microsoft’s　cloud　computing　service　vanished16；Amazon’s
11See，　Jurisdictional　Aspects　ofCloud　Computing
　　Cristos　Velasco　San　Manin
　　February　28，2009
　　http：／／www．coe．int／t／dghl／cooperation／economiccrime／cyl）ercrime／Documents／Reports－Presentations／2079
　　％20ifO9％20pres％20cristos％20cloud．pdf
12Guest　View：Insurance　for　the　cloud
　　SD　Times：Jan　l，2009
　　http：〃www．sdtimes．com／GUEST＿VIEW」NSURANCE＿FOR＿THE＿CLOUDIBy＿SCOTT＿GODES＿
　　AND　IDAN　IVRIIAbout　CLOUDCOMPUT】NG／34021
13RSA’s　Coviello：Cloud　Computing　Not　Secure　Enough
　　PC　World：July　O3，2009
　　http：〃www．pcworld．com／businesscenter／article／167841／rsas＿coviello＿cloud＿computing＿not＿secure＿
　　enough．html
14Cloud　Computing　Risk　Assessment
　　ENISA：Nov　20，2009
　　http：〃www．enisa．europa．eu／act／㎜ノfiles／deliverables／cloud－computing－risk－assessment
l5　Cloud　Computing　Risk　Assessment，　p．10
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cloud　computeri7　and　Google’s　cloud　computer18　systems　were　subject　to　attack　by　unauthor－
ized　installations　ofmalware（computer　worm　or　computer　virus）．
　　　　These　incidents　may　have　given　us　evidence　that　shows　the　incompleteness　of　cloud
computing　architectures．　Cloud　computer　systems　as　a　physical　existence　may　not　be　well－
established　yet，　but　these　systems　are　essentially　a　kind　of　large　enhanced　ordinary　computer
system　having　vulnerabilities　similar　to　ordinary　traditiQnal　server　system．　At　least，　engineers
in　the　cloud　computing　Service　providers　are　the　same　or　similar　people　as　common　traditional
　　　　　　　　　　　り　　　　　　　　　　Server　SyStem　S　englneerS．
　　　　Also　these　might　suggest　some　di伍culties　relating　to　cloud　computering．　That　is，　a　user
has　no　way　to　protect　and　recover　its　own　data　stored　on　virtual　database　system　when　the
stored　data　has　been　accidentally　removed，　eraSed，　vanished　or　modified．　Only　cloud　comput－
ing　service　provider　has　any　control　authority　to　protect　every　data　on　the　cloud　computer　sys－
tem．
　　　　Compared　with　traditional　individual　server　systems，　this　is　obviously　different．　An
owner　of　a　traditional　server　system　can　entirely　control　the　server　system　which　may　involve
database　systems，　and　the　owner　can　protect　its　important　information　and　recover　the　system
and　data　under　lts　own　security　management　contro1．　However，　a　cloud　computer　system　is　not
same　as　traditional　server　system．　The　cloud　computer　system　is　similar　to　an　old　mainf士ame
computer　system　which　consists　of　a　single　main　processing　system　and　many　DAM　terminaI
equipments　such　as　IBM’s　VM　system　or　similar　machines．　Every　user　of　a　cloud　computing
service　may　look　like　an　operator　of　DAM　terminal　machine　who　cannot　install　and　maintain
any　computer　programs　and　software，　but　only　use　and　e切oy　already　prepared　application
software　on　the　system．
　　　　We　have　to　look　at　this　difference　betWeen　an　emerging　cloud　computer　system　and　tradi－
tional　server　systems．　Also　we　have　to　recognize　clearly　that　such　a　difference　may　cause　an
important　change　of　legal　framework　of　network　computing．
　　　　Similarly，　traditional　philosophy　of　management　system　model　and　its　PDCA　method
（ISMS19　etc．）has　not　yet　been　able　to血nction，　because　a　user　of　a　cloud　computer　service　is
the　only　one　of　many　customers　of　the　service，　but　not　a　management　body　of　the　company’s
computer　operation　at　a1L　Only　the　cloud　computing　service　provider　has　control　authority
over　its　whole　cloud　computer　system，　and　the　user　only　has　authority　to　access　to　the　cloud
computer　system　as　an　end　useL
16What　Microsoft　needs　to　do　about　the　Sidekick　fiasco
　　ZDNet　UK：130ctober　2009
　　http：／／community．zdnet．co．uk／blog／0，1000000567，100141790－2000331777b，00．htm
l7　Zeus　botnet　moves　to　Amazon　for　some　grid　action
　　The　Tech　Herald：Dec　l　O　2009
　　http：／／www．thetechherald．com／article．php／200950／4928／Zeus－botnet－moves－to－Amazon－fbr－some－grid－
　　action
l8　Bot　herders　hide　master　control　channel　in　Google　cloud－．Google　AppEngine　co－opted
　　The　Register：9th　November　2009
　　http：〃www．theregister．（So．uk／2009／11／09／bot＿herders＿coopt＿google＿apPengine／
191nformation　technology－Security　techniques　－Code　of　practice　for　information　security　management
　　（ISOAEC　l7799：2005）
　　http：／／www．iso．org／iso／iso＿catalogue／catalogue＿tc／catalogue＿detai1．htm？csnumber＝39612
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　　　　In　addition，　privacy　certification　organizations　and　infbrmation　security　certification
organizatlons　may　have　lost　a　IQt　of　certified　customers　when　the　customers　stoPPed　using
traditional　independent　server　systems　and　changed　to　only　an　end－user　of　specific　cloud　com－
puting　service　providers．　End－users　do　not　have　any　control　over　the　physical　cloud　computer
system．　Therefbre，　certification　organizations　cannot　examine　any　management　plans　and　op－
erations　to　protect　physical　computer　assets　in　accordance　with　the　architecture　of　the　specific
cloud　computer　systems，　and　certify　them．
6．　Conclusion
　　　　Pure　grid－based　public　cloud　computer　system　may　provide　a　contradiction　to　traditional
protection　measures　including　privacy　protection　laws，　trade　secret　laws　and　information　secu－
rity　management　system　models．
　　This　is　due　to　a　change　of　fUndamental　management　structUre　of　netWork　computer　process－
ing　and　data　storage．　ISMS（ISO／IEC　l　7799－2005）notes：
㌧
The　term　of‘owner’　identifies　an　individual　or　entity　that　has　approved　management　re－
sponsibility　for　controlling　the　production，　development，　maintenance，　use　and　security　of
assets．　The　te㎜‘owner’does　nQt　mean　that　the　person　actUally　has　any　property　right　to
the　asset．
　　　　However，　although　a　user　may　have　an　intellectUal　property　right　in　computer　data，　if　the
user　is　a　user　of　a　cloud　computing　service　then　the　user　is　not　bwner’of　its　virtual　computer
on　the　cloud　computer　system，　because　such　a　user　is　not　an　entity　who　has　approved　manage－
ment　responsibility　fbr　controlling　the　production，　development，　maintenance，　use　and　security
of　assets　on　the　physical　cloud　computer　system　at　alL　The　user’s　control　is　really　virtual　and
cloudy．
　　　　Therefbre，　if　anyone　wants　to　maintain　confidentiality　of　specific　computer　data　fbr　con－
firming　compliance　with　legal　obligating　adequate　protection　laws　and　protection　policies，
then　using　of　any　pure　type　public　cloud　computing　service　may　have　to　be　avoided．　Everyone
has　to　choose　a　better　model　of　cloud　computing　service　where　every　user　can　use　not　only
prepared　application　service　on　the　cloud　computer　system　through　a　DAM　terminal　like　slave
communication　machines，　but　also　use　the　user’s　own　operating　system，　application　softWare，
encryption　tools，　communication　protocols，　data　storage　and　other　computer　resources　on　their
private　and　independent　computer　systems　and　related　equipments．
　　　　Everyone　has　to　hold　independence　as　a　management　body　and　make　judgments　on　im－
portant　infbrmation　protection　based　on　their　own　privacy　policy　and　infbrmation　security
policy　in　accordance　with　the　relevant　laws　and　legal　procedures．
〆
